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Public opinion in Poland's transition to market democracy  
 
DAVID MASON  
 
Public opinion research has changed dramatically in the last ten years in Poland, in terms 
of its methodology, scope, and role in political change. During the "first" Solidarity era 
(1980–81), the genie of public opinion was let out of the bottle, and even martial law 
could not entirely put it back. Public opinion polling in the 1980s became more 
sophisticated and more common, and began to tackle increasingly sensitive political 
issues. Public opinion came to play a role in the political process, and to give the Polish 
population a sense of its own purpose and values. It also revealed the depth of antipathy 
to the communist regime and leadership and, in doing so, further eroded the already 
fragile legitimacy of the regime. When, in the late 19805, the regime realized it could not 
succeed at winning back the allegiance, or at least acquiescence, of the Polish population, 
it agreed to negotiate with the opposition. The result was the emergence of the first non-
communist regime in Eastern Europe.  
 
The increasingly more open political atmosphere in Poland has allowed more open 
discussion of the role, methodology, and influence of public opinion. The 
democratization of the political system has also raised some new concerns about the 
results of public opinion surveys; in particular, the extent to which the beliefs, values and 
attitudes of Polish citizens are conducive to a political and economic environment that 
will require participation, tolerance, compromise, competition and patience. The reforms 
of the new government also entail a reduced commitment to policies promoted by the 
previous communist government, including social welfare, full employment, and a 
relatively egalitarian structure of personal incomes. Popular acceptance of the new 
policies and political orientations are crucial to the success of the new government. 
Public opinion surveys can help to reveal the extent of such commitment.  
 
 
The shallow impact of political socialization during the communist years  
 
The most astonishing feature of the 1989 changes in Poland (and Eastern Europe) was 
their thoroughness and rapidity. First in Poland, but later in elections in Hungary, East 
Germany, and Czechoslovakia, the communists were overwhelmingly defeated, despite 
their advantages of incumbency and their last minute efforts to change their images, 
policies, and even names. The scope of this popular hostility is especially surprising 
given the forty years of political socialization pursued so deliberately by the communist 
regime.  
 
Even before 1980, however, it was apparent that the ideological principles of Marxism-
Leninism had little acceptance in Poland. In 1958, only 13 per cent of Warsaw students 
identified themselves as Marxists; twenty years later, still only 18 per cent did (Jasinska-
Kania 1982). Despite the rejection of Marxism, though, most Poles, before 1980, seemed 
to accept the general commitment to socialism, even if they felt the regime had not lived 
up to those ideals. Stefan Nowak reported widespread social acceptance of the 
nationalization of industry, agrarian reform, economic planning, and the transformation 
of the prewar class structure (Nowak 1981). Poles also evidenced a strong egalitarianism, 
particularly regarding incomes.  
 
With the crushing of Solidarity in 1981, and the continued deterioration of the economy 
in the 1980s, even this limited commitment to socialism began to wither away. This was 
recognized and admitted even by the regime. At a 1983 Party conference on ideological 
problems, one eminent ideologist bemoaned an "ideological crisis" manifested in "the 
undermining of the faith of a large part of the Polish society in the value of socialist 
ideals and socialism itself" (Nowe Drogi, October, 1983). Official publications 
complained of the lack of commitment from young people, especially given the resources 
lavished on their political education: "What has happened to the hundreds of millions of  
zlotys that were spent on seminars, camps, conferences, competitions, meetings and all of 
the other forms of political training? All that money seems to have been completely 
wasted" (Sztandar Mlodych, November, 18 1983).  
 
Support for Marxism, particularly among young people, had practically disappeared by 
the mid-1980s. A survey of Gdansk high school students in 1984 found only 2per cent 
declaring themselves Marxists; and support was not much higher among university 
students (Polityka, August 11, 1984). The shift in attitudes was not restricted to young 
people. In a cross-national survey conducted in east and west Europe in early 1990, only 
West Germans (81 per cent) reacted more negatively to the term "communism" than did 
the Poles (80 per cent). And of all the countries, the Poles had by far the most positive 
response to "capitalism." Indeed, East Europeans in general responded more favorably 
toward capitalism than did respondents in the capitalist countries! (Riding 1990). The 
Polish attitudes toward capitalism and communism are a culmination of a trend that 
began in 1980, with increasingly large numbers of people favouring a market-oriented 
approach to the economic system, and a shift in emphasis from favouring equality toward 
favouring freedom. These tendencies will be discussed further below. 
 
State socialist societies are sometimes referred to in the West as "mobilized" societies, in 
that the regimes in those countries attempt to foster high degrees of political awareness 
and political participation, albeit controlled participation. Thus in Poland as in other East 
European states, there were numerous mass-membership organizations, such as the party 
itself but also youth organizations and other special interest groups. Furthermore, formal 
participation in the political process, both in terms of voting and in the number of people 
who serve in elected office, was very high compared to pluralist societies. 
 
Despite the regime's efforts at political mobilization, however, such participation by 
Poles has been ritualistic, at best. Poles neither participated much in politics, nor even 
evinced much interest in politics, and this abstention from political activity increased 
during the 1980s. Even in "normal" times, a surprisingly large number of Poles were not 
aware of even major political issues and events. Surveys done in the mid-1970s showed 
that less than 20 per cent of the residents of six cities could name the president, the first 
party secretary or a single representative in their electoral district (Jasiewicz and Jasinska 
1981). An official poll in 1985 found that only 15-17 per cent of adult citizens were 
"interested in politics" and about half of those were party members (Kwiatkowski 1986). 
This lack of political interest and involvement turned into a major embarrassment for the 
regime in a November, 1987 referendum on the economic reforms. Too few people voted 
to enable the government to win the required majority of all eligible voters. The 
government proceeded with the reforms anyway. 
 
This political disinterest continued even through the remarkable events of 1988 and 1989. 
In August 1988, during the second wave of strikes which forced the government into 
talks with Solidarity, as many as 44 per cent of people admitted to being unaware of this 
decision; a third of the respondents admitted to apathetic attitudes toward political 
developments, and to not paying any attention to them. And during the Round Table 
talks, despite extensive media coverage, most Poles had little knowledge of the 
participants. Even supposedly well known opposition figures like Jacek Kuron (62 per 
cent) and Adam Michnik (49 per cent) were recognized by less than two thirds of the 
respondents. Future Prime Minister Mazowiecki was known by only 20.9 per cent of the 
respondents (Kwiatkowski 1989).  
 
There are many ways to explain this political apathy and erosion of acceptance for the 
regime's norms. The most straightforward, perhaps, is simply the frustration and disgust 
that most Poles felt at the regime's martial law crackdown on Solidarity. For many 
people, this was the last straw and proved that the regime was incapable of reforming 
itself; fewer and fewer people believed in "state-controlled democratization of the state" 
(Magala 1988). There was also increasing recognition and rejection of the privileges and 
corruption associated with the political leadership. But there are longer term, more 
fundamental, reasons as well. Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, a sociologist at the Academy of 
Sciences, argues that in the 1970s, people came to depend on the state as a provider of 
basic economic, social, and educational needs. By the 1980s, as the economy continued 
to deteriorate, many perceived the state as failing at this function, and gave up on it, often 
trying to fulfil these needs outside the public sector, either legally (the private market) or 
illegally (the black market) (Kolarska-Bobinska 1989).  
 
 
The decline of political legitimacy  
 
No political regime, democratic or authoritarian, can last long without a political 
socialization process that breeds at least some support for the government's basic values 
and institutions. In Poland, as we have seen, the political socialization process seems to 
have broken down altogether, particularly after the declaration of martial law at the end 
of 1981. This led to a further erosion of the already debased legitimacy of the communist 
regime. In Poland, as in the rest of Eastern Europe, political legitimacy had increasingly 
come to rest on the satisfaction of basic economic and social needs. There was a kind of 
"social contract" (Hauslohner 1987) or "social accord" (Kolarska-Bobinska 1989, p.l26) 
in which the populace left politics to the politicians and in return the state provided 
economic growth and social services and did not demand much in the way of 
commitment or effort from the population. Indeed, some surveys suggested that Poles 
accepted this as the proper, even desirable, function of the state.  
 
Though the population may not have expected much from the regime in terms of political 
rights, it did hold sizeable expectations in the economic and social realm. As Stefan 
Nowak put it in 1981, most Poles held the state responsible for "the equalization of life 
opportunities, for the development of the potential of all citizens, as well as for the 
satisfaction of their basic needs" (Nowak 1981). In addition, in the 1960s and early 
1970s, there was a high degree of social mobility (both real and perceived) in the country 
that allowed a sense of constant improvement. With the slowdown in social mobility in 
the 1970s, and then the slowdown in the economy itself, the government became 
increasingly unable to deliver on its part of the "compact." By 1980, polls showed that 
Poland had three times as many dissatisfied people as there were, on average, in eight 
western nations. Ironically, Poles had especially bad ratings for social services (which is 
supposed to be the strength of socialist societies), such as medical care, housing, the 
environment, and egalitarian policies (Inglehart and Siemienska 1988). An analysis of the 
"Polacy" surveys in the mid-1980s concluded that only about a quarter of the population 
could be counted as "pro" regime (Jasiewicz 1988).  
 
In capitalist democracies, the government is not always held responsible for economic 
slowdowns. which are often seen as an inevitable consequence of the market. In state 
socialist societies, however, since the government controls the economy, the government 
gets the blame when the economy falters (Gucwa-Lesny, forthcoming). As long as the 
economy was improving, legitimacy was preserved. With the collapse of the economy, 
even this source of legitimacy disappeared. The Jaruzelski regime searched desperately 
for alternative sources of legitimacy, for example in appeals to Poland's national 
traditions (Burant 1987) and by seeking support from the Soviet Union. But with the 
accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership in 1985, even this external 
legitimation began to dry up. The Polish communist party regime was doomed.  
 
The declining faith in the system was reflected in more concrete ways in diminished trust 
in official institutions and public figures, in increasingly outspoken resentment about 
privileges and corruption, and in increasing support for a more pluralistic political 
environment. The most obvious aspect of this was in declining confidence in institutions. 
When the govemment, and then Solidarity, first began publishing such polls on trust in 
institutions in 1981, these consistently showed that the unofficial institutions, especially 
the Church and Solidarity, were much more highly rated than official ones. The Polish 
United Workers' Party (PZPR) always fared badly in such polls, usually ending up in last 
place. In the 1980s, however, the levels of trust in virtually all institutions, official and 
unofficial, steadily declined, though the relative rankings remained about the same. While 
the Party continued to fare poorly (with only about a quarter expressing trust in the 
Polacy '88 survey), the regime's newly created institutional structures didn't do much 
better: the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON) had the confidence of only 
40 per cent in the 1988 survey, and the new trade unions of only 34 per cent 
(AdamskiandJasiewicz1989). Confidence in the Party was even lower among urban 
workers. A December, 1988 survey of 1200 persons in seven industrial enterprises in 
Warsaw showed only 6.8 per cent expressing trust in the PZPR-probably less than the 
total number of party members in those enterprises! These results and others led the 
authors of this Warsaw study to conclude that "the political system is questioned or even 
rejected at all its levels: at the level of the main organs of the state, at the level of 
industrial organizations in which the respondents work, and at the level of individual 
behaviour" (Cichomski and Morawski 1989).  
 
This lack of trust in the party, and the party's sharply decreasing legitimacy, led Poles to 
increasingly question the necessity of maintaining the Party's "leading role" in society. 
The Polacy '81 survey showed that over half of the sample were in favour of a system 
without such a role for the party, and followup Polacy surveys in the 1980s showed 
similar results (Jasiewicz 1988). The Polacy '88 poll, conducted at the end of 1987 and 
the beginning of 1988, revealed only about a third of the respondents favouring 
maintaining the power of the party. Another third was in favour of reducing the power of 
the Party, and the remaining third were undecided or uninterested (Rychard 1988).  
 
Curiously, though, this antipathy toward the party did not, through much of the 1980s, 
translate into a desire to fundamentally transform the system. Even during 1981, 
according to the Polacy '81 survey, only a quarter of the respondents favoured 
constituting new political parties, apart from the PZPR and its satellite parties, the Social 
Democratic Party and the United Peasant Party. There was also little support for the 
proposition that Solidarity should create a political party to operate alongside the union. 
Only 20 per cent of the overall sample, and 23 per cent of Solidarity members, favoured 
this idea (Adamski 1982, p.207). During the middle 1980s, similarly, most people 
seemed to be more interested in improving the economic situation rather than 
fundamental political change. When asked in CBOS polls about what was the main thing 
need to be done to improve the country's situation, the largest numbers of people 
mentioned "inducing people to work better" (50 -60 per cent in various polls) or to 
"reform the economy (40 -57 per cent). Many fewer suggested "changing the 
government" (5 -17 percent) or "changing the political system" (5-15 percent) 
(Kwiatkowski 1989. p.22I). This "apolitical" response was probably due to the 
resignation and apathy that characterized Polish society after the imposition of martial 
law.  
 
In the latter half of the 1980s, however, this attitude began to change, and Poles came 
increasingly to favour democratizing and pluralizing changes in the political system. A 
survey conducted by the Academy of Sciences in 1985 found overwhelming support for 
"respecting freedom and the political rights of the citizen" (90.5 per cent) and for 
"participation by citizens in the making of basic state decisions" (82 per cent) (Gebethner 
and Uhlig 1988, p.139). This began to be translated into more concrete demands as well. 
In this same sample, 65 percent agreed that elections must involve "competition of 
various political parties." By 1988, support for a similar proposition, that "citizens should 
be able to choose between candidates of various political views", was even stronger, 
supported by over 72 per cent. In the 1984 Polacy survey, the sample was about evenly 
divided on whether opposition groups should be legalized. By 1988, many more Poles 
favoured a legal opposition (47.3 per cent) than opposed it (26.1 per cent) (Rychard 
1988).  
 
This increasing commitment to the principles of democracy was connected with a revival 
in support for and confidence in Solidarity. In the early 1980s, Solidarity, like all 
institutions, suffered a sharp drop in popular confidence; from over 90 per cent support in 
1981 to only 11-13 per cent in 1984 and 1985. But by 1988, this started to pick up, with 
the Polacy '88 survey showing confidence in Solidarity up to 25 per cent (Jasiewicz 
1989). Solidarity's approval rating increased sharply over the next year, to 75 per cent in 
March of 1989 (Gluszczynski 1989). In the same period, the perception of Solidarity as 
an institution beneficial to society grew from 18.2 per cent to 67.2 per cent  
(Polityka, March 4, 1989).  
 
There seem to be numerous reasons for the turnaround in Polish public opinion the late 
1980s. First of all, the period of frustration and apathy caused by the martial law 
crackdown had begun to mellow a bit, as Poles, especially younger ones, increasingly 
came back into the political arena. Many of the strike leaders in 1988, for example were 
different, and younger, than those who had led the strikes in 1980. Secondly, there was 
increasing popular frustration and disillusionment with the reform efforts of General 
Jaruzelski and his government. The "Second Stage" of the economic reform was 
continuously revised and delayed, and meanwhile the Polish economy, and Poles' 
standards of living, continued to decline. While Poles had seemingly put their hopes in a 
non-political approach to change, this no longer seemed to work. This leads to the third 
point, which is an increasing awareness that serious economic changes were not possible 
without accompanying changes in the political realm. Fourth, despite the lack of real 
success with the market-oriented economic reforms, the population came increasingly to 
accept the regime's own rhetoric in support of the market in the economy and 
democratization in the polity. Finally, there is the impact of Gorbachev. At an increasing 
pace, especially from 1987, the Gorbachev leadership began to introduce reforms in the 
Soviet Union, some of which were ahead of change in Central Europe. Increasingly, too, 
Moscow began to back away from the principles of the Brezhnev Doctrine, to pressure 
the East European leaders to push ahead with their own reforms, and to promise 
noninterference in the internal affairs of those countries. This had the effect of reducing 
the element of fear of change in Poland, and of undercutting the strength of the 
conservatives in the leadership who resisted change. It greatly widened the "limits of the 
possible" in Poland.  
 
 
From socialist egalitarianism to market justice  
 
These changes in popular consciousness were a necessary prerequisite for the new 
government's plans to apply "shock therapy" to move Poland from state socialism to 
capitalism. It also required some rethinking of the concept of social justice, which was 
such a key element in Marxist theory and in the political legitimacy of the communist 
regimes. In the Soviet Union and other communist states, the achievement of social 
justice was treated as something of a fait accompli that came with the transfer of the 
ownership of the means of production. Social and economic equality was considered by 
party ideologists and politicians to be one of the major advantages of socialist states over 
capitalist ones. The persistence of some types of inequalities, especially in income, was 
justified by citing both Marx and Lenin that in the first stage of communism, i.e. 
socialism, people would be rewarded according to their labour rather than their needs. 
The adverse effects of such differences, however, were to be mitigated by "social 
consumption funds" in the form of free education and medical care, etc. and by 
guaranteeing jobs to all able-bodied citizens (Mason and Sydorenko 1990).  
 
In Poland, as elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, people came to accept the regime's 
commitment to egalitarianism, and even to favour a more radical egalitarianism than the 
government wished to pursue. They also came to rely on the many social benefits 
provided by the state. Despite the government's profession that it was not in favour of a 
total "levelling" of incomes, the gap between rich and poor declined dramatically in the 
postwar years. The ratio of the top ten percent to the bottom ten percent of incomes in 
Poland fell from 41.1 (that is, the richest 10 per cent earned 41 times as much as the 
poorest 10 per cent) in 1945 to 13.8 in 1947 and steadily declined to 3.7 in the early 
1970s (Mason 1983, p.405). Public opinion polls in the 1960s and 1970s showed high 
support for wage egalitarianism as well as other forms of equality. A March, 1980 
survey, based on the Rokeach scale of values, found equality ranked second, behind only 
the family. A national survey conducted in the fall of 1980 found widespread support for 
the study's "egalitarian model," which included proposition on limiting wages for the 
highest wage earners (90 per cent support), realizing a policy of full employment (77 per 
cent) and insuring more or less equal incomes to every citizen (70 per cent) (Adamski et 
at. 1981, p.l 06-109; Mason 1985, p.62-66).  
 
During the 1980s, however, this egalitarianism began to weaken. As Krzysztof Jasiewicz 
points out, a whole series of surveys during this period points to a "slow but steady shift 
in societal preferences from "equality" ...to "freedom"—an acceptance of various forms 
of economic, social and political activity and the differing consequences of that activity" 
(Jasiewicz 1989). A similar conclusion could be drawn from the survey of workers in 
Warsaw enterprises. When asked in which type of society they would prefer to live, the 
most frequent response was "a free society" (36.5 per cent) and a "rich society (21.1 per 
cent). The responses for the kind of society promoted by the communist regime were 
much lower: for a "just" society, 20 per cent; for one "based on friendship and solidarity", 
12 per cent; for one that "provides personal safety, 8 per cent; and for one with a good 
welfare system", only 3 per cent (Cichomski and Morawski 1989).  
 
There are two sides to this movement: one away from equality; and the second toward 
freedom. As to the former, Poles exhibit a dramatic move away from egalitarianism 
during the 1980s. One sees this most clearly in the Polacy surveys, where from 1980 to 
1988 there is a dramatic decline in those "decisively" favouring limiting the highest 
earnings (from 70.6 percent to 27.5 per cent) and in those strongly favouring a policy of 
full employment (50.6 per cent to 25.3 per cent) and a sharp increase in those favouring 
high differentiation in wages based on qualifications (from 25.8 per cent to 40.4 per 
cent). There is also an increase from 1984 to 1988 in those favouring expanded 
possibilities for the private sector, from 59.5 per cent to 73 per cent (Kolarska-Bobinska 
1988, p.115 -116). Ewa Gucwa-Lesny refers to this as a shift "from supporting the equity 
in poverty policy toward one of supporting a just inequality based on the clear criteria 
connected with the efficiency of work" (Gucwa-Lesny). These changes in popular 
consciousness are reflected in the policies and stances of Solidarity, which became 
increasingly less egalitarian by the time of the Roundtable talks in 1989.  
 
 
The obstacles to democratization and stability  
 
The changes in public opinion in the late 1980s in Poland were part of a thorough going 
rejection of the existing system of "real socialism." The elections of June, 1989 gave the 
population the opportunity, for the first time, to demonstrate this in a legal and irrefutable 
fashion. The combination of attitudinal change and structural change (with the formation 
of a non-communist government) marked a revolutionary transfonnation in Poland: the 
old system, its values, policies and institutions, was swept away. This provided a kind of 
clean slate on which the new Mazowiecki government could write its economic and 
political revolution.  
 
There is, however, a darker underside to these changes. The old system having been 
swept away, a new system needs to be put in place. This requires the rebuilding not only 
of the political and economic structure, but also of the structure of values, attitudes and 
patterns of behaviour. In normal circumstances, in any society, these are passed down 
from one generation to the next, at least partly through the process of political 
socialization. As we have seen, however, this process had already broken down, even 
before 1989, and it may take a while before a new process takes its place. This entails, 
among other changes, the restructuring of the educational system, the rewriting of 
textbooks, and a new role for the mass media.  
 
Thus, as in any revolutionary situation, the necessary changes are complex, deep, and 
wide, and they will not be accomplished within just a few months or years. Just looking 
at the political system, for example, students of the process of democratization suggest 
that it takes twelve years or more for authoritarian states to make the transition to a 
"consolidated" democracy (Schmitter 1989). The transitions from state socialist to market 
economy and from "subject" to "participant" political cultures may take even longer. In 
the meantime, the fledgling democratic government in Poland, Jacking the stability and 
legitimacy that is purchased by time, will have many challenges and obstacles to 
overcome.  
 
Among these problems are some aspects of the existing Polish political culture that may 
not be favourable to the years of patience, tolerance, and compromise necessary for the 
consolidation of democracy and the market. These phenomena include a continuing sense 
of cynicism, pessimism and apathy, a remaining commitment by many to egalitarianism 
and socialism, and a relatively weak sense of, and experience with, democracy.  
 
We have discussed above the long-term and increasing sense of apathy and frustration 
that characterized Polish society in the 1980s. The events of 1989 and 1990 temporarily 
reversed this trend, but despite the formation of a Solidarity-led government in the fall of 
1989, there remains a surprisingly high degree of apathy and pessimism. The signature of 
the Roundtable agreements in April, 1989 occasioned little celebration or popular fanfare, 
and the streets of Warsaw on the following day were surprisingly normal. Polls in March,  
1989 showed only about 30 percent of the population willing to join Solidarity, and 47 
per cent saying they had no such intention (Gluszczynski 1989). When Solidarity was 
finally legalized after the Roundtable Agreements, only about 2.2 million people joined 
the union by the summer, far short of the nine and a half million members in 1981. In the 
June, 1989 elections, turnout was far lower than expected. Both sides had thought 80 per 
cent would participate, but only about 62 per cent did so. The runoff elections two weeks 
later attracted less than 15 per cent of the electorate (Polityka, October 14, 1989, p.2). In 
the first completely open and contested elections, for local government councils in May,  
1990, only 42 per cent of eligible voters participated. This was not the same fervour and 
activism seen in 1980-81.  
 
This continued political apathy and lack of participation was due in part to the continuing 
frustration and pessimism regarding the economy. Negative evaluations of the economy 
and pessimism regarding its future had grown sharply during the 1980s, becoming almost 
universal by the end of the decade. This trend, too, seems to have been reversed, at least 
temporarily, with the election of a Solidarity government. Initially, people 
overwhelmingly supported the new Mazowiecki government and expected it to improve 
the economy. But in a December, 1989 poll, only about a quarter of the respondents 
expressed hopes for improvements, with 30 per cent having more fears than hope for the 
future, and 29 per cent expecting Poland to sink further into chaos and crisis. Almost 60 
per cent of the respondents expressed a willingness to take a job in the West (Nowicki 
1989, p.7). During the first half of 1990, monthly public opinion polls showed a steady 
decline in public confidence for all political leaders and institutions (Rzeczpospolita, July 
25, 1990; Polityka, June 30, 1990). These were not hopeful signs, and indicate how thin 
was the reservoir of support for the new government. Further economic difficulties were 
likely to lead to a revival of pessimism, apathy and withdrawal.  
 
This political apathy, which is due in part to the many years of suffering authoritarianism, 
is linked to a relatively weak sense of democracy, also due in part to the lack of 
experience with democratic processes and institutions. The 1985 study on popular 
understandings of democracy found much higher levels of support for civil rights and 
even equal access to material goods than for institutional and procedural aspects of 
democracy such as a multiparty system, contested elections and a critical opposition. On 
this last issue, only 36 per cent "decisively" agreed that the Sejm should have a "legal 
opposition criticizing the government." Overall, the authors of this study found that only 
about 55 per cent of the sample had a "decisively pluralistic orientation" (Gebethner and 
Uhlig 1989. pp.139-140). The flip side of this weak commitment to democracy is a 
disconcertingly strong degree of support for "law and order" in Poland. The Polacy '88 
survey, for example, found almost 78 per cent of the sample agreeing that Poland needed 
a "strong leader who would bring order to the country." In fact, more respondents agreed 
with this statement than with the proposition that voters should be able to choose between 
candidates of various political views (73 per cent) (Rychard 1988, p.284). These data led 
Krzysztof Jasiewicz to characterize the Polish political culture as "sharply polarized" 
between "two contradictory syndromes of values: authoritarian-populist and democratic-
liberal" (Jasiewicz 1988, p.95). Of course, these surveys were conducted before the 1989 
revolution, but it remains to be seen if these syndromes have significantly changed since 
then.  
 
Another potential challenge to the new government, though this more in terms of 
economic policy than politics, is the continuing strong strand of egalitarianism in Polish 
society. Numerous studies, including some alluded to above, point out the sharp decline 
in egalitarian attitudes among Poles. Furthermore, some have contended that the 
egalitarianism of the 19805 was primarily political in character—a reaction to the 
corruption and privileges of the political elite (Kolarska-Bobinska 1989, p.133 -34). 
Other studies, both national and local, have pointed to the increasing acceptance of the 
market, and especially of inequalities in wages and incomes (for example, Cichomski and 
Morawski 1989).  
 
However, the other side of this issue is that the majority of Poles still (at least as of 1988) 
support some key egalitarian principles, especially regarding wages, incomes and prices. 
The Polacy '88 survey showed that 57 per cent supported limiting the highest wages and 
60 per cent favouring a policy of full employment. These figures were far below what 
they had been in the early 1980s, but they were still high enough to suggest some 
opposition to the "shock" of the market introduced in January, 1990. On the other hand, 
there is strong popular support for other important aspects of the reforms, including 
private ownership of property (Morawski 1990).  
 
Commitment to the market is stronger in some sectors of society than in others: as might 
be expected, unskilled manual workers, clerical workers and (to a lesser extent) farmers 
remain fairly egalitarian. Indeed. Poland's official trade unions (OPZZ) leadership tried to 
capitalize on this sentiment at the time of the January price increases: "we cannot agree to 
the policy of free prices and frozen incomes for working people," Miodowicz declared, 
that would lead to "further impoverishment of a considerable part of society" (New York 
Times, January 3, 1990). Perhaps the key question here is the following: if Polish 
egalitarianism was primarily directed against those in power, and those in power are 
increasingly being replaced, will Poles return to the more traditional economic 
egalitarianism of the 1960s and 1970s, which would stymie the market reforms, or will 
they be brought over to the economic inegalitarianism of the market? As the Balcerowicz 
program was put into effect during 1990, polls showed the continued ambivalence of the 
population on these issues. As reforms began to bite, in terms of increased inflation and 
unemployment, the percentage of those solidly supporting the program declined from 39 
per cent in February to 26 per cent in July. In the fall of 1990, only about a quarter of the 
population expressed more hopes than fears about privatization (Centrum Badania Opinii 
Spolecznej 1991). The real effects of the market, at least in the short run, were not as 
pleasant as many people expected. Further deterioration of living standards was likely to 
lead to renewed challenges to the government.  
  
Conclusions: Polish political culture in comparative perspective  
 
The previous pages may have painted an overly pessimistic view of Poland's chances for 
the consolidation of democracy and the transition to the market. It has been customary for 
both Polish and Western social scientists to point to data on Polish public opinion and 
call attention to the high degree of cynicism and apathy, the continuing strands of 
authoritarianism, and the conflicting attitudes held by the same people. In the past, it may 
have been appropriate to view Poland in isolation from Western countries, partly because 
the system was so different, and therefore the political context of public opinion was so 
different from the West, and partly because the nature of survey research in Poland made 
it difficult to compare to surveys in the West. But as Poland moves more toward the 
West, these differences diminish and it becomes more important to place Poland in a 
Western context. It becomes more appropriate, and more relevant, to compare the 
political culture of Poland with that of Western countries: to compare, for example, the 
social conditions for acceptance of the market and democratic institutions. Such a 
comparison would shed further light on the potential for Poland's successful transit.  
 
Such comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper, but a few examples may illustrate 
the point. In the section above, we addressed some of the obstacles to change in Poland, 
including the widespread sense of apathy and pessimism, the low degree of political 
participation, and the continuing support for both egalitarianism and the market. But there 
are similar phenomena in Western democracies. Political apathy and low levels of 
participation, for example, are a continuing source of concern in the United States. Only 
about one half of Americans vote in presidential elections, and only about a third cast 
ballots for the highest state offices (such as governor) or in Congressional midterm 
elections, when the presidency is not at stake. Less than 10 per cent of Americans are 
active enough politically to attend party meetings or work in political campaigns. 
Americans are also abysmally ignorant about their political system: only about 40 per 
cent can name their two U.S. Senators, and less than a third know that the term of a U.S. 
House member is two years (Johnson 1990, pp. 193). By these standards, Polish political 
awareness and participation is quite high.  
 
Similarly, we discussed above the cynicism and pessimism that is characteristic of the 
Polish political culture, and raised the question of whether this would eventually be 
directed at the non-communist government as well. It may well happen, but Western 
democracies are also characterized by high degrees of cynicism and mistrust. In the 
United States, for example, only 39 per cent believe that government is run for the benefit 
of all, while 55 per cent believe that government is run pretty much for a few big 
interests. A majority of Americans feel that the government wastes a lot of money and 
that you cannot trust the government to do right most of the time (Johnson 1990, p.221). 
Despite all this, most Americans express feelings of pride in the country and the system 
of government.  
 
We also saw above that Poles have been highly concerned about what they perceive as 
excessive privileges and corruption within the political elite, but also about the degree of 
inequality within society generally. Here too, though, Polish sensitivities are not out of 
line with those in other societies. In the United States, over 40 percent of the population 
thinks that "quite a few people running the government are a little crooked." In Inglehart 
and Siemienska's comparison of Poland with western countries, they found that while 72 
per cent of Poles thought (in 1980) that some groups had unduly privileged positions in 
society, this figure was lower than in any western societies in the study (Inglehart and 
Siemienska 1988. pA50). Another comparison of 3 socialist and 7 capitalist countries 
found that popular perceptions of inequalities were relatively high in Poland, but at levels 
similar to those in France and Yugoslavia (Cichomski and Morawski 1989). And while it 
seemed paradoxical that Poles would favour both a more market oriented economy and a 
commitment to full employment policies, the same is true in the United States, where 81 
per cent favour guaranteed jobs so people could earn a decent income (Lane 1986, 
p.392).  
 
In the end, the key task for the new government in Poland is to convince the population, 
either by rhetoric or action, that the new order is a just one, both legitimate and fair. In 
the past, justice has been promised, and to some extent delivered, by the polity, and 
people came to expect justice from the regime. When these expectations were shattered in 
the 1980s, people lost both confidence and hope. With the transition to a market 
economy, the government no longer will satisfy all the demands for justice—now the 
market will share some of that burden. In the United States, as Robert Lane has pointed 
out in his article, "Market Justice, Political Justice," people see the market as just, but 
have low expectations of political justice. Most people believe that in both market and 
polity people are animated by self interest: "in the market, however, self-interest is 
thought to be both fruitful for the common good and policed by competition, while in the 
polity self-interest is seen as neither fruitful nor properly constrained" (Lane 1986, 
p.392).  
 
Since in the United States, expectations for the political system are not high, the 
widespread apathy, cynicism and distrust is not particularly threatening to the system.  
 
In some ways, Poland is in an advantageous situation in that expectations have not 
traditionally been very high. and the post-communist government has tried to keep 
expectations under control with constant reminders of the difficult days ahead. Most of 
the warnings by the Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments, however, have been about 
the state of the economy. It may also be necessary to temper expectations for democracy. 
A democratic government will not cure all of Poland's problems, just as it has not cured 
all of the problems in North America or Western Europe. Furthermore, democracy is not 
a fact, but a process. It requires continuous work and adjustment. Poland still has a long 
way to go, in creating both a new government and a new economy. But it has begun, and 
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